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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case
No. 9516

vs.
l\IAX LEON REAY,
Defe·ndant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATE~1ENT

OF THE CASE

Max Leon Reay "\Vas charged with assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery as Count
One, and being an habitual criminal, on the 25th day
of September, 1960. He was charged jointly with one
Arthur John Witchey (R. 6). Preliminary hearing was
had on November 21, 1960 (R. 2). The defendant was
bound over to the Third District Court and was tried
alone before Judge Ray VanCott, Jr. and a jury on the
6th day of April, 1961.
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The infonnation is set forth at R. 8-9 with the first
count and so much of the second count as applies to
Reay appearing at R. 8. After a jury was impaneled and
sworn, the information filed by the District Attorney's
office was read by the Clerk in the presence of the jury
(R. 15). The State produced evidence and rested. Defendant testified; both parties rested. The jury returned
a verdict finding the defendant guilty of assault with
a deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery. The
jury then received evidence on the habitual criminal
charge (R. 67-68) and found the defendant guilty of
being an habitual criminal.
Defendant was comn1itted under the statutory sentence for both counts and filed a timely notice of appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ronald R. Eatchel testified that on the 25th day of
September, 1960, he was employed as the assistant manager of a Safeway Store on the corner of South Temple
and Fourth East Streets in Salt Lake City. One of his
duties was to close the store at night (R. 23-24). September 25th was a Sunday and the store closed at 7 :00
P.M. Sunday, September 25th, his wife Donna arrived
at about 15 minutes to 7:00P.M. She had the automobile.
He closed the store about 7:05 P.M., put the money in
the safe, went outside, locked the door and then padlocked the door, using two separate locks. He had one
key in his pocket and the key to the padlock was on the
car key container in the possession of his wife (R. 25 ).
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The Eatchel car was parked parallel directly in front
of the store about twenty-five feet from the front door.
He went to the car and opened the door for his wife and
baby when a fellow approached and pulled a gun out of
his pocket (R. 26). This person was identified as Arthur
John Witchey. The witness identified the gun as a 22
pistol. It was held by Witchey's leg and never pointed
at hiln (R. 27). He requested them to go back to the
door and wanted to enter the store. The witness convinced him that he had only the one key (R. 28). Witchey
escorted them back to the car. Another car was parked
behind the Eatchel car (R. 29). Witchey got in the other
car and it drove down Fourth East behind the witness'
car, with the lights out. There was another person in
the Witchey car, the witness claims, on the driver's side
(R. 30). The Eatchel car turned west on First South
Street and proceeded to the Police Station. The Witchey
car continued down Fourth East.
Eatchel reported the holdup attempt to the police
about 7:20 P.l\L (R. 31). The witness testified he had
never seen the defendant Reay in the vicinity of the
Safeway Food Store (R. 32).
Donna Eatchel testified that she was the wife of
Ronald. On September 25, 1960, she called for her husband around a quarter to seven in the evening. She
parked the car parallel in front of the store, facing east.
Her husband closed the store and locked two locks (R.
3-±). She had the keys to the padlock on the ring with
the car keys. As they were entering the car, a person
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approached with a gun (R. 35). She identified this person as Arthur John Witchey. Witchey took them to the
door then back to the car. She saw another car which
she later identified as a black Buick, license No. DC 4554
Utah. \Vhen asked who was behind the wheel, she thought
it was the fellow who had the gun (R. 37). They turned
west on 1:!-,irst South and went to the Police Station (R.
38).
!fike Clark testified that he was a police officer with
the Salt Lake Police Department, with three years'
experience in traffic and radio patrol. He was at the
County Hospital at 7 :00 P.M. on September 25, 1960.
He had proceeded north on State Street when he received
a general alarn1 920 (robbery). It was at about 17th
South and State (R. 40). Between 13th and Ninth South
on State Street, he received an automobile description1949 Buick, License No. Utah DC 4554. At Sixth South
and State he saw the described car facing east waiting
for a red light. He made a left turn, then a U-turn and
pulled behind the car and verified the license number
(R. 41). He got out and asked the occupants to get out.
He identified the defendant Reay and Arthur John
Witchey as the occupants. Reay was driving; Witchey
was on the passenger's side. He found a 22-cali.bcr
revolver under the right front seat (R. 42). The revolver
was entered as Exhibit 1 without objection. Five expended cartridges and four live cartridges were entered
as Exhibit 2. At the time he first sighted the car, it was
7:21P.M.
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Reay n1ade no statement to the officers; was told
hy the officers not to say anything. The State rested.
The defense put on the defendant (R. 46). He testified that he knew Witchey; had seen him on September
25, 1960, in Salt Lake City; he lent Witchey a car
belonging to Rex Marsh about 6:00 P.J\1. (R. 47).
Witchey let Reay out at Walgreen's Drug Store on ~fain
Street and said he would pick him up again in thirty to
forty minutes. Reay never SRV{ the gun, Exhibit 1 (R.
48). \Vhen picked up, he asked the officer why he was
arrested. The officer did not tell him (R. 50).
After Witchey dropped him at Walgreen's, he had
two beers and waited for \Vitchey on Walgreen's corner.
He is not too familiar with Salt Lake City streets (R.
53). He believed Witchey lived on Fifth East or Second
East. Witchey left for about forty minutes (R. 56).
The defendant testified on cross-examination that
he had been convicted of two felonies; that he had
kno,vn Witchey for about two or three years. After
\Yitchey dropped him at Walgreen's he went north up
1Iain Street. The car belonged to Rex Marsh and he
had been living with Rex Marsh and using the car for
several days. Defense rested.
The jury was instructed by the court. No instructions were requested nor exceptions taken by either side
(R. 56). The jury returned a verdict of guilty of the
crime of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to
comnlit robbery, as charged in the information (R. 84).
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Court reconvened and instructed as follows:
"Mr. Liston, will you read the information
with reference to the second counrt (sic) and
the plea the defendant has entered thereto~" (R.
67).
The State offered and the court received over objections, Exhibits 3 and 4. Exhibit 3, an exemplified copy
of a commitment of one Max Leon Reay from Idaho, and
Exhibit 4, certified copy of a commitment from the
Clerk of the District Court for Salt Lake County.
The State rested without testimony or other proof
connecting the defendant with the Exhibits 3 or 4 (R.
67-68). The jury was instructed on count two charging
defendant with being an habitual criminal (R. 68-69-70),
retired and returned with a verdict of guilty of being
an habitual criminal.
STATE~1ENT

OF POINTS

POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 4.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN HAVING THE ENTIRE INFORMATION READ TO THE JURY UPON BEGINNING THE
TRIAL OF THE ASSAULT CASE.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS 3 AND
4 WITH NO FOUNDATION WHATSOEVER TO CONNECT
THE EXHIBITS WITH THE DEFENDANT.
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ARGlTMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

A careful review of the evidence and that portion
of the case concerning the assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to commit robbery does not disclose a scintilla
of evidence connecting the defendant Reay with the
cri1ne. Ronald Eatchel, one of the State's witnesses,
stated that another person was in the Witchey automobile
in front of the Safeway Store on South Temple, but did
not identify that person even as to sex (R. 30). On crossexamination, he unequivocally stated that he did not
see Reay on September 25th at 7:00 P.M. (R. 31). He
(Eatchel) further states that the only place he ever saw
Reay was at the city jail (R. 31). Mrs. Eatchel stated
that there was another fellow sitting in the car, but
didn't purport to identify him as being the defendant
Reay (R. 37).
Officer Clark identified the defendant as being in
the Buick car earlier identified by Mrs. Eatchel, at a
later time when the car, facing east on Sixth South
Street at that street's intersection with State Street,
·was waiting for a red light (R. 41). Reay was driving.
The police car made a left turn in front of the Buick
and then aU-turn on Sixth South Street and pulled up ·
behind the Buick. Reay made no attempt to flee (R. 41).
Reay made no admissions to the officers that might connect him with the crin1e charged; in fact, he was told by
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the officers not to talk. There is no other evidence connecting Reay with the crime, and no evidence putting
him closer than ten blocks to the scene of the attempted
holdup. There is no evidence connecting him with the
weapon found in the car and no evidence even inferring
a knowledge of what Witchey's intentions or plans had
been.
The sole circumstance causing the arrest and the
charging of the defendant Reay was his presence in an
automobile with Witchey twenty to forty minutes after
the attempted holdup and more than ten city blocks from
the place of the attempted holdup, headed in a direction
which would take the car closer to the scene of the crime
rather than in apparent flight. Witchey did not testify.
In State v. Marasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 P. 2d 919, the
court considered and reversed a case directly in point
with this case. In the Marasco case there were further
facts to back up the one circumstance. In that case the
defendant was charged with arson of a store owned
by him in Helper, Utah. After the explosion that started
the fire, a man was seen running away from the building by two witnesses, neither of whom could identify.
The explosion was between 2 :30 A.M. and 3 :00 A.M.
At 3 :30 A.M. the defendant, together with Turzo, was
seen in Castlegate, Utah, approximately four miles from
the scene of the explosion and fire. He there hired a
man, who was later a witness in the case, to take him
to Salt Lake City. Defendant asked this man "to say
nothing about taking him in" and later ''to say nothing
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in court" and "say it wasn't him." Turzo was connected
with an autmnobile that was found burned and contained
kegs containing gasoline at the scene of the explosion
and fire. The defendant ~1arasco had a defense of alibi
and on the stand denied being in Carbon County on that
date. The court, in reversing the Marasco conviction,
states at page 922-923:
"That son1e of such testimony shows suspicious circumstances may well be conceded. Perhaps the most probative is the testimony that
the defendant at Castlegate, about 4 miles from
the scene of the crilne, about thirty or forty
minutes after the building was demolished and
on fire, hired a man to drive hi1n to Salt Lake
City and ad1nonished the driver to say nothing
about it, frmn which some elements in the nature
of a flight might be inferred. The corpus delicti
being proven, the fact that an accused fled from
the vicinity where a crime was committed, and
having knowledge that he was likely to be arrested
for the crime or charged vvith its commission, or
suspected of guilt in connection therewith, may be
shown as a circumstance of guilt, and may be
considered in connection with other evidence or
circumstances tending to connect the accused with
the commission of the offense. But it is only a
circumstance. It alone will not justify conviction
of the defendant, in the absence of other evidence
tending to connect him with the commission of the
crilne. 8 R.C.L. 192. A leading and well-considered case on the subject to that effect is State
v. Poe, 123 Iowa, 118, 98 N.W. 587, 101 Am. St.
Rep. 307. To that effect also are People v. Wong
Ah N gow, 54 Cal. 151, 35 Am. Rep. 69; Smith v.
State, 106 Ga. 673, 32 S.E. 851, 71 Am. St. Rep.
286.''
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Reay, in the instant cas8, took the stand for the
purpose of explaining his presence in the car with
Witchey at the time of arrest. It 1s apparent that the
jury chose not to believe him. Whether their disbelief
arose from the evidence of his prior convictions or his
demeanor on the stand is immaterial. Again citing from
the l\:'farasco case, at page 923:
"There is the further circumstance, the statement of the defendant to the city marshal that
at the tiine of the commission of the offense he
was in Salt Lake City and disputed by the testimony of the witness that just after the fire the
defendant was at Castlegate and the testimony
of another witness that at 8 o'clock on the morning of the fire he was seen at Provo, about 73
miles from Helper, and about 45 miles from Salt
Lake City; a claimed alibi being a shield or weapon of defense, which, if disbelieved or discredited,
may not be turned by the state into an offensive
weapon or as affirmative proof connecting the
accused with the commission of the offense. There
being no direct evidence connecting the defendant
with the commission of the offense-no such evidence is claimed by the state-and considering
all of the suspicious or shown circun1stances together, we are of the opinion that the evidence
is insufficient to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense and to let the case go
to the jury."
The only item of evidence connecting Reay with the
offense charged is his presence in an automobile which
had been identified as being at the scene of the holdup,
but at a different place and at a different time.
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"Whenever circumstantial evidence is relied
on to prove a fact, the circumstances must be
proved and cannot be presumed, and the circtunstances proved must be consistent with the
n1ain fact sought to be presumed. They must be
not only consistent with the theory which is sought
to be established, but absolutely inconsistent with
any other rational theory." 20 Am. J ur., Evidence, Weight and Sufficiency, Sec. 1190, citing
Carter v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 65
Utah 465, 238 P. 259, 41 A.L.R. 1495, among other
cases.
The court instructed the jury in compliance with
this citation (Instruction No. 5, R. 74), but it is
apparent from the entire record that the jury did not
follow said instruction.
While it is unfortunate that neither a motion to
dismiss was made at the end of the State's case, nor a
motion for directed verdict upon both sides resting, the
crime charged carries a sentence of five years to life,
76-51-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953. It is also the third
conviction charged in an habitual criminal count under
76-1-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953, carrying a minimum
fifteen-year sentence. An appellate court cannot in good
conscience refuse to consider the utter lack of evidence
due to failure of counsel at the trial level to make proper
motions, or the failure of the trial court to invite such
motions.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 4.

In Instruction No. 4, the court instructed the jury
as follows:
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"You are instructed that all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether they
directly commit the act constituting the offense,
or aid or abet in its commission, are principals
in any crime so committed, and where two or
more persons with a common intent engage jointly
in the commission of an unlawful act, each is
responsible for the act or acts of the other done
in the furtherance of their common design." (R.
75).
Neither the evidence nor the pleadings called for
such an instruction and it was prejudicial to the defense.
While we agree that under the laws of Utah one who
aids or abets is a principal, the information (R. 8) does
not charge Reay with aiding or abetting Arthur J.
Witchey in assaulting Ronald and Donna Eatchel, but
jointly charges him with the assault itself. The evidence
as discussed in the preceding point gives no inference
that Reay loaned the car to Witchey for the purpose of
committing a crime or with the knowledge that he
(Witchey) contemplated the commission of a crime.
There is no evidence of Reay's advising or encouraging
the commission of a crime. The evidence does not put
Reay at the scene of the crime. The mere fact that he
was driving the aut01nobile at a later time, even combined with evidence of the knowledge of the commission
of a crime or flight (neither of which is shown by the
evidence), could only justify a charge of being an accessory after the fact and would not support or justify
Instruction No. 4, supra.
The .:Marasco case, supra, citing State v. Baum, 47
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Utah 7, 151 P. 518-19, with regard' to a similar instruction, says:
"There was no evidence to show and no one
claimed that the defendant but aided and abetted
in the cmnmission of the offense, advised' or encouraged its commission. There, hence, was no
occasion to give that kind of a charge. Under
the circumstances we think it was Inisleading and
harmful.
"The Baum case in such particular was approved and followed in the case of State v. Siddoway, 61 Utah 189, 211 P. 968. To the· same
effect were further cases cited in 17 P. 2d at 924.
It is familiar doctrine that it is erroneous to give
instructions based on a state of facts of which
there is no evidence tending to prove, though
such instructions abstractly contain correct statements of the law. We, here, think as was stated
in State v. Baum, that the giving of the instruction
as modified was erroneous and prejudicial.''
It is again admitted that the record shows no exception to have been taken to this or any other instruction
by either party. However, it is the policy, in fact, the
very essence of our appellate system, that a person
should not be allowed to be convicted of crimes carrying
penalties of the magnitude here involved' due to failure
of counsel or the trial court to take advantage of procedural steps contemplated by our trial system.
The court instructs on "aid and abet'' and totally
fails to define those terms. The jury could have well
believed that the mere presence in the automobile at a
time following the crime could constitute aiding and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
abetting, or either of them, even in the absolute absence
of evidence showing Reay's "knowledge" or "intent", as
is displayed by the record.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN HAVING THE ENTIRE INFORMATION READ TO THE JURY UPON BEGINNING THE
TRIAL OF THE ASSAULT CASE.

After the jury was impaneled and sworn, quoting
R. 15, "The clerk read the information filed by the District Attorney in said case." The information (R. 8-9)
contains two counts, the second being the charge of being
an habitual criminal under 76-1-18, and alleging and
identifying two previous felony convictions. The record
does not indicate the reading of only count 1 or a deletion of the words "and of being a habitual criminal in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 1, Section 18, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953" as set out in the heading of the information (R. 8). 76-1-20, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
setting forth the procedure in charging and trying a
person charged with being an habitual criminal, states
in part:
"The jury shall not (emphasis ours) be told
of the previous convictions of felony and' the trial
on the felony committed in the State of Utah shall
proceed as in other cases."

State v. Stewart, 110 lTtah 203, 171 P. 2d 383, 386,
following and approving this procedure as outlined in
State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 A. 452, 457, and in
State v. RB~lly, 94 Conn. 698, 110 A. 550, states at page
387:
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• • •* * * The information should be divided
into two parts. In the first the particular offense
with which the accused is charged should be set
forth, and this should be upon the first page of
the information and signed by the prosecuting
officer. In the second part former convictions
should be alleged, and this should be upon the
second page of the information, separable from
the first page and signed by the prosecuting officer. The entire information should be read to
the accused and his plea taken in the absence of
the jurors. When the jury has been impaneled
and sworn, the clerk should read to them only
that part of the information which sets forth the
crime for which the accused is to be tried. The
trial should then proceed in every respect as if
there were no allegations of former convictions,
of which no mention should be made in the evidence, or in the remarks of counsel, or in the
charge of the court. When the jury retire to
consider their verdict, only the first page of the
information, on which the crime charged is set
out, should be given to them. If they return a
verdict of guilty, the second part of the information, in which former convictions are alleged,
should be read to them without reswearing them,
and they should be charged to inquire on that
issue. Of course, the accused may plead guilty
to this part of the information, and then no further proceedings before or by the jury would
be necessary. No reason appears why the accused,
if he should' choose, might not submit this issue
to the court without the jury.

" 'In this way the well-recognized rights of
an accused person will be protected, and the
principles of justice and our long-established laws
which have been designed to secure an impartial
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trial in every criminal cause will be recognized,
respected, and obeyed.'
"The court also pointed out that until a
verdict has been rendered on the principal issue,
there is no occasion to mention the prior convictions since previous offenses would not be
competent to prove that defendant committed the
offense for which he is then on trial. Likewise,
the court remarked that by directing attention to
prior offenses, a defendant may be deprived of
the presumption of innocence, and in doubtful
cases a verdict of guilty n1ight be based on prior
convictions instead of on the basis of proof of
the particular crime for which defendant is on
trial.''
With regard to the above, also see State v. Russum,
107 Utah 94, 152 P. 2d 88, following State v. Ferguson,
83 Utah 375, 28 P. 2d 175.
It appears from the record by which this court is
bound that the information filed by the District Attorney
was read to the jury prior to the trial of the assault with
intent to commit robbery case. The infonnation itself
(R. 8) shows both counts to he on the same page. Neither
the information on its face nor the record of the transcript of the testimony at R. 15 indicates a deletion of
either the words "and being a habitual criminal in violation of 78 (with a "6" above the "8" sic), Chapter 1,
Section 18, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as follows, to
wit:", or a deletion of count 2 of the first page of the
information, although there are certain ink marks on
count 2 that would indicate only that part of the charge
regarding Max Leon Reay was read. Under the situation
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as shown by the record, the jury was informed of alleged
prior convictions, and though no attempt was made by
the State to prove said convictions in the first phase of
the case, such reading of the information prejudices the
defendant and his counsel in their choice as to whether
the defendant should testify or take advantage of his
statutory right to silence.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS 3 AND
4 WITH NO FOUNDATION WHATSOEVER TO CONNECT
THE EXHIBITS WITH THE DEFENDANT.

The State offered no proof to show that the person
or persons named in Exhibits 3 and 4 were the same
person as the defendant. The defendant objected to
admission of the documents on the ground that they
were not the best evidence, and said objections were
overruled by the court.

State v. Br'Uno, 69 Utah 444, 256 P. 2d 109, at page
110 citing 16 C.J. 1342, says:
"In all crirninal prosecutions when the State
desires to inflict a more severe penalty on account
of the defendant having been convicted previously,
the burden is on the State to prove all facts necessary to bring the case within the statute authorizing such penalty to be imposed. Thus, like
any other material element, the State must prove
prior conviction of the accused and must establish his identity as the person previously convicted. (Citing cases and texts)."
And at page 111:
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"If it were held that because a person has
the same name as a person who has theretofore
been convicted of a similar offense, it follows as
a matter of law that such person is the same
person as was named in the prior proceeding,
such holding would be contrary to our fundamental principles and proceedings in criminal actions.
It would be a denial of right to trial and determination by jury, one of the essential facts always
necessary to be found in order to convict an
accused of the graver offense."
The writer is aware of the case of State v . .Aime,
62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704 (1923), which is distinguished
from the Bruno case, supra, on the basis of additional
evidence besides the identity of names. 11 A.L.R. 2d 870,
et seq. contains an exhaustive annotation on the question,
listing the Aime case, supra, as holding identity of names
to be sufficient, and the Bruno case (a later case) holding identity to be insufficient. Many of the cases go off
on a basis of the cmnmon or peculiar nature of the name.
However, in the case at hand, there is no evidence of the
prevalence of the name "Reay'' either here or at the
location of the Idaho conviction.
Under the procedure set up 1n the Stewart case,
supra, the habitual criminal count is, or at least it should
be, tried as a distinct connt, and the fact that the defendant testified as to two felony convictions should be
neither an affirmance or a denial of Exhibits 3 and 4
where the defendant did not choose to testify in the
latter phase of the case.
The status of being an habitual criminal carries a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19

greater statutory penalty than any crime 1n our code
with the exception of the two top homicide counts. Evidence of prior commitments of a person of the same
name should not be allowed to go to a jury without substantial foundation to identify the copy of the commitments with the person of the accused, or (as the Bruno
case sets forth) it will not meet the fundamental principles and proceedings of our criminal actions and violates the intent of the lJtah Constitution, Article 1, Section 12, and 77-1-8(6) and 77-31-4, ·utah Code Annotated
1953.
SUMMARY
It is the belief of the writer that a scrutiny of the
transcript of the trial is in itself enough to compel a
reversal of the conviction of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery, and it is elemental
that in the absence of that conviction the finding of
Reay's status as an habitual criminal cannot stand under
the provisions of 76-1-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
It is interesting to note that, though Witchey had
pleaded guilty and been sentenced on the identical crime,
thus depriving him of his right to refuse to testify by
his constitutional right against self-incrimination, U.S.
Constitution, Fifth Amendment, and though he was in
court under the State's subpoena (R. 14 and R. 48), the
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State did not see fit to use him as a witness. While he
was also accessible to the defense and the reason for his
silence remains undisclosed, the State is charged with
the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which
burden the record does not sustain.
It is respectfully submitted that the assault with
intent to commit robbery charge should be dismissed,
carrying with it the key conviction necessary to sustain
the count ·of being an habitual criminal, or in the alternative, that the habitual criminal charge be reversed due
to the procedural violations to the intent of 76-1-18
and 19 and the failure of the State to identify the defendant ·with Exhibits 3 and 4.
With respect to the habitual criminal count, the
record indicates that the State and the court did not
follow the procedure recommended by State v. Stewart,
supra, and cases cited therein and, further, that there
was absolutely no proof of identity of the defendant with
Exhibits 3 and 4.
Upon the above reasoning and errors of the court,
defendant contends, first, that the initial charge of assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery
should be dismissed for entire lack of evidence to connect the defendant with the crime and for prejudice arising from erroneous Instruction No. 4 and prejudice
arising from the reading of the information to the jury
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containing the habitual criminal count, indicating two
previous felony violations before the evidence commenced, or in the alternative, to dismiss the habitual
criininal count due to prejudice and procedural violations as set forth in Point Nos. 3 and 4, and an entire
failure of the State to identify the defendant with Exhibits 3 and' 4 other than as to name.
Respectfully submitted,
SUMNER J. HATCH
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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